Commissioner for Germany (1949 -55) , the League had a long tradition inside Germany. It had been founded already in 1914 and had pursued an ambitious program not only of safeguarding civil liberties but also of international activism. In the interwar era, it was known above all as an organization committed to opposing the Nazi threat to Weimar democracy. After 1945 it attempted to establish continuity with its pre-1933 principles and also to adapt those principles to a new domestic and international situation. As it did so, however, it was vulnerable to political co-optation from the Right, which posed the problem of how to disentangle human rights claims from a selfexculpatory German nationalism, and from the Left, which threatened its readiness to criticize East German violations of human rights. It also faced efforts at co-optation from the anticommunist Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), which drew the League into its cold war struggles in Berlin, and from Americans in or close to the occupation authorities who sought to detach it from its traditional pacifism. Its story demonstrates the difficulties of grafting the universalistic language of human rights onto the political struggles of postfascist West German society amid wartime destruction and cold war division. By the early 1960s, the League overcame those difficulties by making German responsibility for the Nazi past and its implications for politics in the present into the centerpiece of its human rights advocacy. While the League had always been known for its antiNazism, its recommitment to this now historical issue must be seen in the context of the struggles between 1945 and the 1960s, especially of its members who were Jewish and non-Jewish former émigrés.
After the Second World War, the Western Allies and leading West German politicians and intellectuals promoted "rights talk" as they sought to democratize West German society. They described Nazi acts as violations of human rights, for example, and encouraged West Germans to think of political issues in terms of rights. 2 Yet the universal, abstract quality of rights did not lend itself well to addressing responsibility, a central issue in a postfascist society like West Germany. The League confronted problems for which no abstract norm could provide guidance: what role was the past to play in current human rights advocacy? How was it to define victim and perpetrator? Who could be a human rights advocate, and for whom could a German one speak? For oneself, or only for others? All human rights organizations must place limits on the possible answers to these questions in order to establish sufficient 2 Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie: Der amerikanische Beitrag, 1945 -1952 (Opladen, 1993 ), 69 -70 and 286 -333. On ex-Nazis' rights talk, see, e.g., Eugen Kogon, "Der Kampf um Gerechtigkeit," Frankfurter Hefte 2, no. 4 (April 1947): 373-83, and also the remarks on law and rights by Ernst von Salomon (to be precise, a conservative revolutionary, not an ex-Nazi) in his Fragebogen [The Questionnaire], trans. Constantine FitzGibbon (New York, 1955), 3. stability for their work. As the League wrestled with defining suffering, negotiating between old-timers and newcomers, and giving both the past and the present their due, it also faced fraud and espionage, the side effects of running a highly politicized organization in unsettled times.
The League's newfound stability coincided with important political and social shifts around 1960 in West Germany, during what turned out to be the last years of Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship. Adenauer's long tenure provoked discussion of the state of West German democracy and the threat of "Portugalization"-that is, renewed dictatorship. With the banning of the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) in 1956 and the SPD's shift to the right, a new political space opened up to the left of the SPD that was not defined by political parties. Into this space stepped the movement against atomic weapons along with new human rights-related organizations of lasting importance, such as the West German section of Amnesty International (established in 1961 shortly after the organization was founded in Britain earlier that year) and the Humanist Union (Humanistische Union, also founded in 1961). Neither of these organizations took on the full range of domestic and international human rights issues at that time: Amnesty forbade members to investigate cases in their own countries, and the Humanist Union was at that time a purely domestic civil liberties organization, ignoring even East Germany. The history of those organizations illustrates what a new political climate offered by 1960. However, it is the history of the League, with its embrace of both domestic and international issues, that reveals the arduous conditions of human rights activism in the Federal Republic between 1945 and 1960. The later, more successful organizations may well have learned from the League's difficulties as they developed their own styles of human rights advocacy in the Federal Republic.
THE GERMAN LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE 1945
The League has a long and distinguished history. Like the American Civil Liberties Union, it originated in pacifist circles during the First World War, when the state restricted dissent against the war so sharply that pacifism became a major civil liberties issue.
3 It began as the New Fatherland League (Bund Neues Vaterland), founded in November 1914 to promote a peace without annexations and to reveal the truth about the German political leadership's role in starting the First World War. 4 The organization linked do-mestic political reform to international peace. After the war, the New Fatherland League worked closely with the French League for the Rights of Man (Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, LDH), a Dreyfusard organization founded in 1898. 5 In 1922 the New Fatherland League adopted the French League's name, becoming the German League for Human Rights, to reflect their common goal of German-French reconciliation. Politically, the League was close to the German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft), founded in 1892, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (Internationale Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit), founded in the Netherlands in 1915. 6 During the Weimar Republic, the League sought to strengthen Germany's first democracy at home while pursuing international reconciliation abroad. It took the unpopular position in Germany that the conditions of the Versailles Treaty ought to be fulfilled and that good relations with France and Poland were paramount. In the domestic arena, it published exposés of rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty, the Weimar judiciary's "political justice" favoring the Right, far-Right "Feme" and later Nazi Party political murders, and excessive use of emergency powers in the late Weimar Republic. The League took a consistently strong stand against antisemitism in Germany. It also spoke out on behalf of persecuted radicals such as imprisoned revolutionaries in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria and Sacco and Vanzetti in the United States. It provided legal aid to thousands of German defendants who suffered from a politicized judiciary or Nazi violence. The League's political affiliations were formally nonpartisan but distinctively Left. It was closely allied with the SPD and sometimes cooperated with the KPD. As the Nazi threat grew, some League members advocated a popular front against Nazism.
See Richard A. Cohen, "The German League for Human Rights in the Weimar Republic" (PhD diss., SUNY Buffalo, 1989); Werner Fritsch, "Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte (DLfM), 1922-1933," Some of the most famous radical and pacifist intellectuals of the era were League members, including Albert Einstein, the sexual rights leader Helene Stöcker, diarist Harry Graf von Kessler, journalist and civil servant Hellmut von Gerlach, the president of the German Peace Society Ludwig Quidde, journalist Carl von Ossietzky (editor of the Weltbühne), and satirist Kurt Tucholsky. The League was always small (in 1932 it had only about two thousand members), but that suited it well, as members did not wish it to be a mass organization. 7 On the contrary, they wanted to make sure that all members were personally convinced of the importance of the group's goals and able to articulate them independently.
The League elicited the hatred of the nationalist Right and the Nazi party, both for its politics and for the prominence of Jews in its ranks. Within weeks of the Nazi seizure of power in January 1933, many League members fled or were arrested. Robert M. W. Kempner, head of the League's legal aid office and later a U.S. prosecutor at two of the Nuremberg war crimes trials, destroyed the League's files before fleeing in order to prevent the Nazis from finding information on their opponents. Soon afterward, the Nazis raided and closed the League office.
8 Carl von Ossietzky, who had been a member of the League's board, continued to publish criticism of the Nazi regime and was arrested in 1933. He received the 1936 Nobel Peace Prize but was never freed, and he died in 1938. 9 Shattered by political persecution and emigration, the German League for Human Rights ceased to exist except in name. One general secretary of its Weimar years, Kurt R. Grossmann (1897-1972), fled to Prague, on to France, and then to New York City. The other Weimar-era general secretary, Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt (1873-1964), went to London. From there, LehmannRussbueldt used the name "League in Exile" to refer to a tiny, loosely organized group of émigrés. In October 1944, he and a few others met in London to discuss refounding the League.
10 Unlike other exiles who insisted on the existence of an "other Germany" (anderes Deutschland) that had survived the Nazi era morally unscathed and would restore an unbroken tradition of German civilization as soon as the Nazis were defeated, LehmannRussbueldt argued that Nazism revealed deep flaws in German political and 7 Fritsch, "Deutsche Liga," 749. 8 11 Even as he and his circle committed themselves to advising and supporting a League to be refounded by Germans inside Germany, they were not very optimistic about its chances. At the same time, émigrés such as Grossmann and Lehmann-Russbueldt were not necessarily popular in Germany even after Nazism was defeated. Given these unpromising circumstances, how might Germans inside Germany build a post-Nazi human rights organization? THE FRANKFURT AND WUPPERTAL LEAGUES AND THE PROBLEM OF "GERMAN HUMAN RIGHTS"
In May 1945, few German organizations could look back on an early, clear, and principled anti-Nazi position like the League's. Yet moral authority did not translate easily into organizational strength. The League's prestigious name made it attractive to those seeking private gain. After all, human rights organizations are conduits for money. As one longtime League member noted, unscrupulous persons founded nonprofit organizations in the economic hard times of the early postwar years for selfish or shady goals: "either they register their apartment as the organization's office, so as not to have to offer living quarters to the local housing office, or they allocate to themselves, as the 'executive,' a monthly income from the organization's funds, etc." 12 A more profound difficulty was how to match the political purpose of the League to the social and political conditions of defeated Germany. The prewar League had helped especially those who, as a result of their own political beliefs, were oppressed by agents of the state-much as the later Amnesty International has helped individual "prisoners of conscience." 13 Persons of strong democratic principles who are also outspoken in the face of danger tend to be few in number. The Weimar-era League was accustomed to helping a relatively small number of dissenters and victims of specific instances of unfair trials, and to acting as a watchdog regarding the state's abuse of power. After 1945, however, much had changed, and in a morally complex way. The Allies were the new powers in occupied Germany. task of defeating Nazism, at which the German resistance, including the League, had failed. The League might have taken up again the basic task of acting as a watchdog organization regarding the state's abuse of power by exposing abuses of power by the Allied occupation forces. Yet that would ally the League with its erstwhile oppressors: the many Nazis and Nazi sympathizers who were now busy pointing out the Allies' shortcomings. Opposing state power held by the occupation forces could not be the centerpiece of the League's program.
Meanwhile, millions of Germans were experiencing very real suffering connected with defeat (the results of wartime aerial bombardment; expulsions from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere; postwar hunger), and they were formulating their suffering in terms of violated rights-but their predicament did not fit the League's model. Either such Germans had been sympathetic to Nazism and so their political beliefs were unworthy of defense, or they were politically inarticulate and so did not fit the "prisoner of conscience" model. Soon, another large group of German sufferers joined those whose homes had been bombed, those who fled warfare, and those who were expelled at the war's end: Germans leaving the Soviet Zone of Occupation and later the German Democratic Republic for the West. Again, these persons were sometimes politically articulate, but usually they were not. 14 How was the League to maintain its continuity of purpose yet also to find a responsive audience after 1945, when it was surrounded by huge numbers of the "wrong" kind of victims?
Several local groups calling themselves the "German League for Human Rights" or some similar name and seeking contact with leaders of the Weimarera League sprang up in the British and U.S. zones of occupation between 1945 and 1947. 15 There was no central oversight for these Leagues; indeed, any political self-organization required Allied permission and was only gradually permitted to grow beyond the local level. Soon, some local League groups claimed the exclusive right to use the League's name and threatened to sue other groups who persisted in sharing that name. The Weimar-era members considered themselves the arbiters of which of these League groups 14 18 "International reconciliation" and the "abolition of armed conflict" were prominent. References to Franklin D. Roosevelt's "four freedoms" and the United Nations Charter signaled the League's strong support for the United Nations. 19 The League sought the "eradication" of "nationalistic and militaristic writings." The Frankfurt League held that capitalism promoted militarism, and therefore it advocated the "abolition of all rule by violence or class" and "a fair and 16 humane economic order." The Fabian Society, with its academic studies and experts, was its model. Kudrnofsky and his colleagues were no orthodox Marxists. Not class struggle, but rather persuasion-"campaigning for human rights and social justice by seeking to influence the press, parties and governments"-was their chosen means of social change. Their non-Marxist Left politics also appeared in the last point of their program, to promote "cultivation of the personality through the promotion of all intellectual [geistigen] and moral developmental possibilities of the individual person while emphasizing the common interest." 20 In practical terms, the Frankfurt League set the goals of producing pamphlets, scholarly investigations, and expert opinions; holding discussion evenings, public lectures, and rallies; providing legal aid; and maintaining ties with similar organizations around the world. Only in 1947 did the U.S. Military Government permit the Frankfurt League to hold public events at all; by mid-1948, it had held forty-eight public assemblies. 21 Its membership rules banned former Nazis and former members of Nazi organizations unless three League members vouched for them and they underwent a one-year probation. 22 The Germany nor those who emigrated had had any contact with him. 25 However, Dietz's Wuppertal League did include some prominent Weimar-era members, such as the pacifist journalist and priest Otto Maria Saenger and the journalist Jakob Stöcker. 26 Dietz even invited Kurt Grossmann, the Weimar-era League's general secretary who was living in New York, to serve as its first chairman. Grossmann responded in a letter that he also published as a statement on the predicament of German-Jewish émigrés. In it, he explained that as a Jew and as a new and loyal U.S. citizen, he would not return to live in Germany. 27 However, Grossmann did want to help the League in postwar Germany, and his correspondence shows that he invested considerable time in it. Grossmann and other Weimar-era League members took Dietz seriously as the new postwar leader of the League and genuinely appreciated Dietz's initiative. 28 From the beginning, however, there were signs that Dietz was not interested in preserving continuity with the Weimar-era League. First, he disregarded the League's traditionally democratic self-governance: he refused to consult his advisory board (which included Weimar-era League members) before embarking on campaigns, and he kept the Wuppertal League's finances secret. 29 Second, he sought a mass membership, a strategy with several ramifications that ran counter to League traditions. While the Weimar-era League had ensured political reliability by requiring any new member to be endorsed by two old ones, Dietz dispensed with that procedure even for former Nazis.
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And while the old League had relied on individual members' willingness to dissent from majority views, the Wuppertal League offered charitable and fee-based services to members: help in locating apartments and jobs and in finding addresses of German prisoners of war, initiating a pen-pal program intended to persuade youth abroad to send food and clothing to Germany. Dietz even planned to open a for-profit business under the League's name aimed at ethnic German expellee customers, to sell tools to aid them in 25 resettlement. 31 None of these projects implied any willingness on the part of members to dissent or indeed to articulate any political vision. Yet another ramification of Dietz's mass-membership strategy was that the quest for more members might drive his League's program. Two issues that were important and popular but fit poorly with traditional League priorities of international reconciliation were the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, and the retention of German prisoners of war in Allied custody (especially in the Soviet Union). The Hanover League, under the influence of Wuppertal, drew large crowds with events such as a lecture on defeated Germany's status under international law. The speaker, Hamburg University international law professor Rudolf Laun, used that issue as the framework for his criticisms of the expulsions of ethnic Germans and the detention of German POWs. 32 Indeed, international law had recognized the prolonged detention of prisoners of war as a human rights violation since 1907, and expulsions of civilian populations were coming to be seen as such during 1945 and are considered clear violations of international law today. 33 The prolonged detention of German POWs and the expulsion of ethnic Germans certainly constituted legitimate human rights issues and were much discussed in occupied and West Germany. 34 However, they were also the favorite issues of unreconstructed Nazis and nationalists, who invoked them to obscure the origins of the war, relativize Nazi cruelty, and shift blame to the Allies for the horrors of war. Older League members did not deny the importance of these issues, but they believed that the issues lent themselves all too easily to the expression of German nationalism and self-pity. 35 They insisted that such issues be discussed together with the fates of non-German POWs and refugees in order to express the League's internationalism rather than a concern with the interests of Germans only and demanded that these issues be put in the context of a wider condemnation of war. 36 Without such a context, Grossmann and others argued, the League was in danger of becoming an organization focused only on "German human rights." 37 Older League members also believed that suggesting to expellees that their return home was possible at all was mere demagogy.
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The Wuppertal League clashed with the other leagues most fundamentally over the question of defining victims. While Dietz saw Germans primarily as victims, the Weimar-era members saw Germans primarily as oppressorsincluding those Germans who had clearly suffered. Dietz invoked human rights as a source of entitlements for Germans, not as an ethical obligation, and he eagerly sought an international audience for his views. For example, Dietz complained to a British pacifist: "Outsiders are making a great many unfair accusations against the German people. Please note that these injustices which are being inflicted on our people today have led me to speak out on behalf of my countrymen, just as we in the League have spoken out on behalf of human rights wherever they are most cruelly violated, no matter by whom." 39 The universality of human rights, according to Dietz, compelled his attention to Germans (he did not specify the "unfair accusations" mentioned above). His colleague Karl Kny, a Sudeten German who oversaw expellee affairs in the Wuppertal League, likewise sought an international audience for an article in which he complained that Germans were being victimized and implied that there would be dire consequences if the borders settled at the Potsdam Conference were not redrawn in favor of the German expellees: "It is absolutely necessary to make a return possible for the expellees whose fields now lie fallow and call for their industrious hands. . . . There is no other way unless one wants to perpetuate present conditions, which would mean nothing 35 less than a new catastrophe." 40 The idea that Germans' industriousness entitled them to Eastern European lands was a stock notion of German nationalism in the Nazi years and earlier. Kny's invocation of "a new catastrophe" was both threatening and vague: did he mean that the expellees would again suffer on the scale of the original expulsions, in which 12 million had been displaced and half a million died? 41 Or that the expellees would start a new war? 42 Kny asked Grossmann to help place the article in the U.S. press, apparently oblivious to the fact that such statements made Grossmann and other Weimarera members cringe.
The Weimar-era League members' point of departure was that most Germans did not value democracy, did not know the full extent of Nazi crimes, and did not want to know. For these older members, German aggression in the Second World War had to be part of any discussion of postwar affairs. As the Bielefeld League put it: "Each one of us [in the League] must know that we are to work, within the scope of our organization, toward restitution, namely the restitution of damages done especially to the racially and politically persecuted. Collective responsibility need not be declared or accepted, but it must be uncontroversial among League supporters that all Germans have taken on a debt [Schuld] so great, that the sufferings of the years after 1945, undeniable as they are, really cannot be called a 'reckoning,' in order to be, as it were, even." 43 (The post-1945 sufferings alluded to here were, for example, economic hardship, food shortages inside Germany, industrial dismantling by the Allies, and expulsions of ethnic Germans.)
These League members sought to make the League a means of confronting fellow Germans with the facts of the Nazi past and educating them to be democrats conscious of the human rights tradition. The Bielefeld League, for example, held discussion evenings on "the idea of human rights since Voltaire" and restitution to Nazism's victims; circulated issues of critical and democratic periodicals such as the Frankfurter Hefte; and recommended to members Eugen Kogon's Der SS-Staat, the earliest major publication on the 40 IfS NLV S 1/1 309, Kny to Grossmann, December 10, 1947 (enclosure). 41 The most common statistics on the expulsions estimate 12 million displaced into East and West Germany and 2 million dead as a result of the expulsions. See, e.g., Michael R. Nazi camp system. 44 The various Nuremberg Trials, which ran from 1945 until 1949, fit these members' views regarding the importance of documenting atrocity and assigning blame to specific individuals. Only those Germans who had resisted Nazism or who had educated themselves about the nature of Nazism ought to be spokespeople for human rights, they thought; otherwise the language of human rights inside Germany risked being discredited. A Bielefeld League newsletter expressed this idea when it stated: "the struggle for justice and human rights is completely justified in the case of Germany as well, but-and this is always decisive-it depends on who feels called upon to be a protector of human rights." 45 The older League members also presupposed a different audience for the League than did Dietz. While Dietz appealed to Germans who felt misunderstood by an unfriendly world, the older League members, with their experiences of exclusion and emigration, wished to use the refounded League as a "bridge to abroad" 46 to prove to the world that Germans had repented of their ways and had changed. On this view, the postwar League could be "in a certain sense a guarantee for our German people's democratic convictions and democratic constructive will." 47 Acutely aware of how German complaints were received abroad, older League members urged that the League not focus on controversial causes that would alienate its human rights counterparts abroad. 48 The German League "must fit itself harmoniously into the great circle of the other Leagues of the whole world," choosing the same goals, if it was to lay claim to defending human, as opposed to German, rights. 49 influential ones, who are prepared to show the occupation powers through deeds, not words, that German circles are willing and committed to making good-faith sacrifices in order to prove their goodwill regarding peace in Europe." 50 The older League members, and especially the émigrés, had in mind an audience for the League that extended beyond Germany or was even located primarily outside of Germany.
Both Dietz's and the Weimar-era members' approaches had their limitations. One of Grossmann's most trusted League colleagues from Weimar days, Katharina Kupsch, pointed this out to him in 1947. She rejected Dietz's approach of foregrounding Germans' suffering. If the League wanted to do that, she commented sarcastically, "we could, for the sake of convenience, ask for the Nazi party's membership list, publish a little appeal, and we'd have it made." But she also rejected the idea of a League refounded for the sake of "moral and material restitution for the human rights violated by Germany." That was "too retrospective." "I believe that it is not pedagogically soundnot only in the case of children-to first count up all the instances of wickedness in order to show that one must behave better." 51 For Kupsch, one could not embark on human rights activism on Germans' behalf only, but one could not do so against them either. She pointed out to Grossmann that many Germans, including politically sympathetic ones, were truly suffering in these postwar years and could not accept the idea that Germans were always and only victimizers. 52 Moreover, the two approaches were incompatible. Nonetheless, Grossmann in New York, Lehmann-Russbueldt in London, Kudrnofsky in Frankfurt, and the leaders of allied League groups Friedrich Welter in Bielefeld and Rudolf Herrmann in Hamburg all persisted for a surprisingly long time in seeking an accommodation with Dietz over the direction of the League. Dietz's rude 50 IfS NLV S 1/1 308, "Ü ber die Selbstkenntnis." 51 LBI KGC, Kupsch to Grossmann, April 25, 1947. 52 The experience of another postwar West German organization, the Societies for Christian-Jewish Cooperation (Gesellschaften für Christlich-Jüdische Zusammenarbeit), conceptualized and funded by the U.S. occupation authority, suggests that Grossmann's approach would have been ineffective. Historian Josef Foschepoth has shown how the societies were harmed in their early development by the desire to prove that Germans had overcome antisemitism and to improve Germany's international reputation. The problem here was that insisting that antisemitism belonged to the past in fact served to shut down discussion of its nature and presence in postwar Germany, and even inside the organization itself. The societies in their early years devoted far more attention to, for instance, U.S. racism against black people than to antisemitism in Germany (very little) or the Holocaust (none sought only a license from the western Allies. 66 Although stressing his own anticommunism, he defended the presence of communists on his board on the grounds that they were authentic members of the old League and in fact exerted little influence. The League was, he insisted, overwhelmingly SPD. 67 But in the tense atmosphere of Berlin in 1948 -the time of the Berlin Blockade and airlift-the League appeared to the U.S. Military Government to be at least potentially a Communist organization. 68 (The British and French authorities continued to be willing to license the League.) The League came under immense pressure to purge its neutralists and declare itself unambiguously anticommunist.
The U.S. Military Government turned to the Berlin SPD, making it the arbiter of the League's political status. 69 Although the SPD party chairman, Franz Neumann, called the League a "camouflaged Communist organization," he apparently also indicated that, as a U.S. official summarized, "the SPD is not disinclined to support the League if a larger part of its sponsors were SPD members." 70 The SPD began to pack the League with people from Neumann's own circle, and apparently offered the League assistance with its license application and with funding.
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The transformation of the Berlin League into an anticommunist organization was also driven by Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt in London. Like Grossmann and Kudrnofsky, Lehmann-Russbueldt was irritated by the Berlin members who were "half or full-blood communists." 72 To their old colleague Oehlschläger, Lehmann-Russbueldt and his allies in Germany argued that the Soviets would never permit the League in its genuine form because of the latter's entirely different notion of human rights and that Kiendl's International League was in fact a tool of the SED that was preventing a genuine League from coming to fruition. 73 As in the case of Kudrnofsky's confrontation with Dietz, in this confrontation Lehmann-Russbueldt had no legal priority over Kiendl and could not sue him for misuse of the League's name. The Weimar-era League had been legally dissolved under the Nazis, and until Lehmann-Russbueldt could reverse that dissolution by presenting the coercive conditions under which it had taken place, neither he nor Kudrnofsky nor any other Weimar-era member had legal priority over anyone else who might use the League name. Unlike Kudrnofsky in his confrontation with Dietz, Lehmann-Russbueldt faced an opponent who had a loyal following of authentic Weimar-era members. They could not be ousted on the grounds of being impostors. In May 1948, the Berlin court did reverse the Nazi-era deletion of the League's legal registration. 74 Now Lehmann-Russbueldt's allies in Berlin made their move, using anticommunism as the litmus test in a takeover from within. They publicly accused Kiendl of being responsible for the League's failure to obtain a license since 1945 and demanded that SED members Paul Oestreich and Walter Persicaner leave the League. 75 Certainly LehmannRussbueldt shared with the Berlin SPD a strong anticommunism: he wished to go to Germany himself to guide the "reconstruction of the League as a defence organisation on Western democratic lines against totalitarian movements" that had "special tasks for its vanguard in Berlin." 76 It is possible that he also benefited materially from its closer relationship with the Berlin SPD, which seems to have assured the new League's finances. Both he and his daughter Ingeborg, who lived in Berlin, subsisted in poverty and hoped for sinecures through the League. 77 After the League was remade as an anticommunist organization, it employed Ingeborg Lehmann as its secretary and invited Lehmann-Russbueldt to serve as honorary president. Lehmann-Russbueldt's move to West Berlin in 1951 was made possible by a pension that Ernst Reuter arranged for him.
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The Berlin League was finally granted a license by the three Western powers in Berlin in May 1949. 79 Struggles over its political direction continued right up to its constitutive meeting in November 1949. Oestreich and Alfred Kantorowicz (the writer and literary critic) tried to pull the League back to a more neutral, less anticommunist position, but failed. At the constitutive meeting, there was "stormy discussion of a resolution against the concentration camps, forced labor, and kidnapping of the Eastern Zone system." 80 When this resolution passed with a strong majority, the communist members left, and the ensuing vote produced a new board that shifted the League leadership to the right of even the May licensee list. Six of the ten board members were in the SPD. These included the noted Berlin politicians Jeanette Wolff, a survivor of Stutthof, and Willy Kressmann, an émigré and now mayor of Kreuzberg. Oehlschläger was the only one of the old Kiendl group to remain on the board. 81 As the League's new chairman, SPD member Jochen Klaus Schaefer, noted, "any attempt to exert Communist influence on the League's work was . . . completely eliminated." 82 The group, which adopted Lehmann-Russbueldt's preferred name, German League for Human Rights, now gained the support of some of the most influential figures in Berlin, including Ernst Reuter, the hugely popular SPD politician who was mayor of West Berlin between 1948 and 1953. 83 There was one opinion that the communists and anticommunists in Berlin 78 Brinson, " 'Im politischen Niemandsland,'" 136 -37. 79 shared: that Berlin, not Frankfurt, was the rightful headquarters for all the leagues in Germany. 84 As the cold war intensified in 1947 and 1948, Berliners were anxious not to be abandoned by western Germany. Yet from the perspective of those in western Germany, it seemed foolhardy to assume that Berlin would remain outside the Soviet zone of occupation. This pitted the Berlin League members against their counterparts in western Germany. For example, Kudrnofsky's Frankfurt League opposed the communist-leaning Berliners for their politics, but it also saw the anticommunist Berliners as troubling rivals. As it happened, Berlin prevailed: the Berlin League gained new backing just as the Frankfurt League missed the chance to gain its own powerful ally.
It was really a second cold war story that sealed the fate of the Frankfurt League: the value of the League's past was dismissed in a demoralizing encounter with an American civil liberties leader. In fall 1948, the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Roger Nash Baldwin, visited Germany at the invitation of Lucius Clay, the Military Governor of the U.S. Zone of Occupation. Baldwin was interested in tracking the civil liberties record of the United States as an occupying power. He recommended that the U.S. Military Government help found a civil liberties organization to promote Germans' sense of the importance of checking state power over the individual. Knowing of the German League of Human Rights from Grossmann and other émigrés in New York, he contacted Kudrnofsky. 85 Communist organization." 87 Baldwin conceded that proximity to communists was inevitable in the years of fighting Nazism, but he could not get over the stumbling block of the League's reputation for "fellow-traveling."
88 Baldwin also listened to other Germans who warned him away from the League: both conservatives, who predictably called it too Left, too Jewish, and too intellectual, and those who were closer to the League politically but who told Baldwin that it could never exert the broad influence that a civil liberties organization modeled on the ACLU would need. 89 Baldwin ultimately decided to set the whole complicated question aside: "A fresh start had to be made." 90 For Kudrnofsky and the other Weimar-era League members, of course, the League's very history and politics were what made its name so valuable after 1945.
Kudrnofsky and Baldwin also differed in their strategic approach to human rights advocacy in Germany. Baldwin wanted to draw in as many Germans as possible. He was less interested in confronting them with difficult truths than in persuading them of the respectability of defending individuals' rights against the state. To ensure such respectability, he objected to the League's "political" program; its pacifism in particular was not "opportune."
91 Baldwin wanted his planned organization to focus purely on domestic civil liberties in order to appear as nonpartisan as possible. He also used the typical U.S.
Military Government strategy of turning to local notables-in this case University of Frankfurt academics, Frankfurt-area lawyers, and the GermanAmerican Clubs-to spearhead a project. The idea here was that local notables' reputations would attract their conservative and apolitical neighbors.
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The clubs, a creation of the U.S. Military Government that was intended to ease the nonfraternization policy, were certainly no hotbed of critical opposition, and Kudrnofsky indignantly called the University of Frankfurt faculty "reactionary elements." 93 Kudrnofsky rejected the strategy of appealing to local notables or the apolitical public, believing that it would dilute the membership's commitment to League principles. Baldwin even encouraged Germans to lodge complaints about the U.S. occupation, as a way for them to hone their awareness of the individual's rights against the state.
94 Kudrnofsky rejected the idea of attracting new League members by inciting criticism of the occupation, which he associated with the behavior of former Nazis. From London, Lehmann-Russbueldt ridiculed Baldwin's idea, writing: "I am tempted to write a satire on the outcome of this experiment."
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The negotiations between Baldwin and Kudrnofsky dragged on until mid-1949, in part because Baldwin wished to make use of Kudrnofsky's connections and in part because Kudrnofsky hoped to still save something for the Frankfurt League. Baldwin failed to appreciate the depth of the conflict between Frankfurt League members like Kudrnofsky and Emil von Wedel, on the one hand, and the Frankfurt notables whom Baldwin was also cultivating for his organization, on the other. The two sides clashed in a humiliating meeting at which the League was dismissed as a relic from "bygone times" and "tending sharply to the Left." 96 Wedel that the League's name was to be exploited while the actual longtime League members were to be pushed to the side. Baldwin threw his support and that of the U.S. occupation (soon to change from a military to a civilian agency) behind a new, separate civil liberties organization, the League for Civil Liberties (Bund für Bürgerrechte). Perhaps Kudrnofsky's Frankfurt League would not have flourished in any case, but if Baldwin thought he had chosen a safer path, he was wrong. The new organization fell far short of Baldwin's vision for an overarching civil liberties organization that would help educate West Germans about their rights. It lasted only as long as the American money behind it, folding in 1954. 97 As we have seen, the Berlin League spent 1949 gaining its license and moving further in a pro-SPD and anticommunist direction. It was now poised to supersede the Frankfurt League as the headquarters for all League groups in West Germany. An ill Kudrnofsky spent the last months of his life engaged in a lawsuit against yet another shady group of League impostors in Frankfurt. 98 He died in 1950. Lehmann-Russbueldt moved to Berlin in 1951 to become the honorary president of the Berlin League, having apparently decided that it was the most promising of the local groups. 99 Indeed, the Berlin League prospered financially after 1949, as its new glossy journal and extensive activities attested. It has not been possible to determine all its sources of funding, but the Berlin SPD, the city of Berlin, and (in the 1950s) U.S. funds via the High Commissioner for Germany seem the likeliest. It also received donations from the anticommunist German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB). 100 The Berlin League strayed far from its old ideal of nonpartisan independence, according to which it was to reject any political party's endorsement or funding. Meanwhile, old problems-former Nazis in the League and the question of charity-in a new context of cold war plunged the League into its deepest crisis yet. The most pressing human rights issue from the standpoint of West Berlin in the 1950s was the repression all around it in the German Democratic Republic. Yet when the League threw itself into that work, it became entangled in the cold war intrigues of that city and was overwhelmed by powerful political and material interests. It proved unable to protect people who were both inside and outside the League.
THE LEAGUE IN 1950S BERLIN: ESPIONAGE AND CORRUPTION
Based in West Berlin, the German League for Human Rights had over a dozen chapters across the Federal Republic in the 1950s. 101 Stressing its independence from political parties, governments, and religious affiliations, it issued statements against dictatorship, colonial exploitation, and violations of individuals' rights in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. It also emphasized the importance of educating the West German public about Nazi crimes. In 1953 it launched a new periodical, Die Menschenrechte, which critically discussed the Nazi past-for example, praising the Nuremberg trials and criticizing West Germany's decision to grant pensions to Condor League veterans of the Spanish Civil War.
102 Such work carried forward the Weimarera League's internationalist and democratic goals. The League also criticized the Soviet Union: conceding that the Western powers also posed a threat to peace, one article stated firmly that the lack of real democracy in the Soviet Union and East Bloc meant that a genuine peace movement could only exist in the West. 103 This was an accurate reflection of the position of older League members such as Kudrnofsky and Lehmann-Russbueldt. 104 However, by 1952 the West Berlin-based League exhibited some changes in political direction that disturbed older League members. In May 1952 members in West Berlin voted to support West German rearmament under the European Defense Community's plan for a European army. 105 This plan did offer an alternative to integrating West Germany into NATO (which in fact happened in 1955). It was also consistent with the League's now absolute anticommunism. (An example of that anticommunism was League chairman Schaefer's assertion that the Soviet Union had been seeking to dominate the entire world ever since the Potsdam Conference in summer of 1945.) 106 However, supporting rearmament violated the League's traditional strict pacifism. In 1953, the West Berlin leadership published a pamphlet celebrating the League's fortieth anniversary that publicized both that vote in favor of a European army and its abandonment of the old League statutes. Membership requirements were changed so that former Nazis could now join as long as they had the board's approval and "accepted the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 without reservation"-hardly a strict criterion, given the general acclaim for that document at the time. 107 In the mid-1950s, the situations of German POWs and expellees reappeared as human rights issues in Die Menschenrechte. 108 In 1955, Die Menschenrechte began a regular feature that suggested that communist crimes were on a par with Nazi ones. Entitled "You Are Not Forgotten," it juxtaposed stories of victims of Nazism with stories of victims of East German Stalinism. 109 The most fateful change was the Berlin League's decision to establish hostels for East Germans who were fleeing the German Democratic Republic and arriving in droves in West Berlin. In 1952 the border between the two Germanies was sealed, making the island of West Berlin into East Germans' main outlet to the West. By early 1953, tens of thousands of East Germans arrived in West Berlin each month. Then a statewide uprising in East Germany broke out on June 17, 1953, leading tens of thousands more to flee into West Berlin. Over half a million arrived from East Berlin and the rest of East Germany in 1952 and 1953. 110 West Berlin was overwhelmed. Over fifty camps were set up in West Berlin for fleeing East Germans, and the League became one of many organizations seeking to help the refugees. 111 The League opened its first hostel in 1952, and by 1953 it was running four hostels. 112 The hostels provoked a debate inside the League about whether charity was its proper task and whether the East Germans were indeed political victims. The Weimar-era League member Karl Retzlaw, now speaking for the Frankfurt League after Kudrnofsky's death, argued that the League was "not a welfare organization" and that fleeing East Germans, whose political views were unknown and who had in common only their material need, were unlikely to become principled defenders of causes beyond their own situations. 113 In fact, the mass flight from East Germany did not fit well with the League's traditional, narrowly political definition of refugees: persons who had individually articulated their political opposition to a dictatorial regime. As historians have more recently shown, when interviewed upon arrival in West Berlin, most East German refugees did not give specific political reasons for their journey. It is notable that the West German state, which was otherwise eager to represent the mass flight as the result of East Germany's unfreedom, recognized only 14 percent of East Germans as official political refugees. 114 Retzlaw believed that the cold war preoccupation with the East Germans was a way of turning attention away from still-inadequate restitution to victims of Nazism and the "renazification" of West German society: "Eastern Zone refugees are 'fashionable,' while we fighters against Hitler and the war are not only 'unfashionable' but also in the highest degree unwanted." 115 For the West Berlin League, however, the East German regime deserved condemnation as much as Nazism. 116 Their comparison was bolstered in late 1952 and early 1953, when the Paul Merker trial took place-an East German version of the anti-Jewish Soviet "doctors' plot" and the Czechoslovak Slánský trial. 117 Most East German Jews had fled by March 1953, and the League established a hostel especially for them.
118
It proved perilous for the League to run these hostels in such a politically charged environment. The East Germans whom the League sought to help were magnets for spies from both sides. Soviet and East German intelligence agencies recruited fleeing East Germans to inform on each other in West Berlin reception camps, while Western intelligence agencies hoped to gain from the East Germans information about the internal affairs of the secretive new German Democratic Republic. U.S. intelligence officers, for example, demanded access to East Germans who were undergoing official West German review for recognition as political refugees. 119 Some West Germans in militant anticommunist organizations also sought to use East Germans to distribute clandestine anticommunist literature to relatives and friends left behind in the GDR. 120 As money from the CIA as well as from West German political parties and other organizations flowed into militant anticommunist organizations and as the League moved into the orbit of those organizations, it was in danger of becoming a tool of cold war politics and, perhaps worse, a source of money for unscrupulous people.
Conflicts among League members over these issues came to focus on the person of the extraordinarily energetic Alfred Götze. He had been elected to the board at the constitutive meeting in November 1949 and then became vice president, serving under the League's president, Jochen Klaus Schaefer (a lawyer also apparently new to the League). Götze soon held simultaneous League posts as general secretary, head of the supplies department, and head of a department he created for refugees fleeing East Germany. 121 It was Götze who was behind the project of the hostels: with the help of League members who held posts in the West Berlin government, such as his close friend Otto Bach, he arranged for the West Berlin Senate to allocate public monies to the League, as it did to other organizations that ran shelters for the refugees. 122 Götze was the one who drew the Berlin League into the milieu of the militant anticommunist organizations.
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Götze was also the author of the controversial fortieth-anniversary pamphlet. Its text foregrounded his own activities, especially regarding the hostels. In it, he mentioned having taken trips on behalf of the League to France each year since 1946 to meet with the French LDH and to work toward affiliating the League with the Paris-based International Federation for the Rights of Man (Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, FIDH), which he accomplished in 1947. 124 As we have seen, however, the League hardly existed as a coherent organization in Berlin in those years. The French LDH was itself barely in existence at that time. 125 Moreover, Lehmann-Russbueldt and other Weimar-era League members intended the League to be affiliated with the International League for the Rights of Man (ILRM) in New York City, not the FIDH. 126 Götze's pamphlet includes other statements that are not corroborated in old League members' correspondence and do not fit traditional League goals. For example, he claimed to have cooperated with the LDH to negotiate successfully with the French Ministry of War to ameliorate conditions for German POWs held by France and for Germans imprisoned and awaiting trial for war crimes in France. He even claimed to have helped secure the release of some of the latter. 127 Yet the traditional goals of the League did not include aiding Germans accused of war crimes. Götze's pamphlet provoked outrage from Frankfurt. Retzlaw cited the rearmament vote, the hostels, the failure to exclude ex-Nazis from membership, and the numerous violations of League traditions as reasons for distancing himself completely from West Berlin. He forbade Götze to use the League name anywhere near Frankfurt.
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Von Wedel wrote a furious public letter of resignation. 129 The Frankfurt League, refusing to cave in to the West Berlin League yet unable to stop it, became dormant. 127 Götze also claimed credit, along with the LDH, for preventing the application of the "Lex Oradour" in French trials of Germans accused of war crimes. The Lex Oradour, named for the destroyed village and residents of Oradour-sur-Glane, held that it was only necessary to prove a person's membership in a unit that committed war crimes, not individual participation, to find the person guilty. 40 Jahre, 9 -10. 128 131 The available sources suggest two possible occasions for the exposure of Götze's past in the League. First, he applied to join another organization, and someone there linked him to an article in the Nazi newspaper Der Angriff (November 3, 1934) that stated that he had belonged to the SA, the NSDAP, and the SS and wrote him to reject his application for membership. See NARA RG 242 A3340-PK-D104 (NSDAP party correspondence). This file contains a long letter from Götze dated October 28, 1953, seeking to exonerate himself, and he notes that a carbon copy was sent to Ernst Carlbergh, who was one of Götze's opponents on the League board. Second, he sion from the League. In early 1954 a committee assembled by Schaefer exonerated Götze. Oddly, the committee did not directly refute the SS allegation, but rather stated merely that he "need not reproach himself about his political past." 132 Götze's wife, Anneliese, lost her post as overseer of the hostels, yet no reason was given. Götze's critics on the League board did not accept the committee's exoneration of Götze and resigned. Now that his most vocal opponents were gone, new elections to the board resulted in a strong mandate for Götze's side. Schaefer even entrusted Götze with a tour of West Germany in late 1954 to strengthen the West Berlin League's relationship with the various League groups on the basis of its cold war priorities, including the hostels. Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt then asked the new board to reopen the investigation into Götze's record. When the board refused, he resigned as honorary president and publicly distanced himself from the League. This was a major embarrassment: Lehmann-Russbueldt was the most famous link to the League's Weimar past.
Oddly, Götze's past had only gradually come to light. A former Freikorps and SS member, Götze first appeared in the Berlin League in the summer of 1947, as one of SPD party chairman Franz Neumann's circle who helped pack the League with SPD members. 133 He ingratiated himself with several of the authentic League members who opposed Kiendl, including Ingeborg Lehmann-Russbueldt. 134 Already then he was caught out by Kiendl and others in a lie about having been imprisoned in 1933 for League work; in fact, he had served time and been expelled from the SS for another offense entirely. 135 Götze refused to fill out a denazification questionnaire (required of everyone seeking to become a League licensee) and for that reason was only able to join the League board after it was licensed. Already in early 1949 the U.S. Military Government had retrieved his SS record and noted him as a "doubtful element," and it granted the League's license on the condition that the organization be watched. 136 Apparently, an unintended side effect of marginalizing Kiendl (who knew the truth about Götze) and strengthening the hold of the SPD on the League was to render Götze's position in the League more secure.
Götze was also apparently a spy for the Second Bureau (Deuxième Bureau), the French military intelligence agency. Anneliese Götze indicated that it had been French intelligence agents who approached him after 1945 with the suggestion of reviving the League. 137 This puts Götze's energetic work for the League-especially his trips to France and interest in the hostels-in a different light. Apparently his value to French intelligence depended on the access to East Germans that the hostels provided. His espionage work was part of a web of anticommunist activism, corruption, and dangerous exposure to the Stasi. Under Götze and his supporters, the League sought to gather information from the GDR and to distribute illegal literature inside the GDR, and it recruited people to do this dangerous work. These people were to work in groups of three inside the GDR, with one serving as courier and bringing materials to the West Berlin apartment of a League employee. Götze, his wife, and their allies turned to the people in the hostels, who were dependent on and therefore vulnerable to those who administered them. Some were willing to participate, or could be persuaded when plied with food, drink, and payment. Official West German recognition of a person's status as political refugee could be dangled before an East German as an enticement, or the possibility of its denial could be used as a threat (such recognition carried material benefits and, as we have seen, was relatively rare). Others were manipulated or even coerced into passing on information or recruiting their relatives who remained in the GDR. For example, addresses of a hostel resident's relatives in the GDR were apparently conveyed to the League office without the hostel resident's knowledge, and then the League sent requests for secret reports to those relatives in the GDR, giving the impression that the hostel resident 136 wished them to comply or would fare better in the West if they did. Affairs and even rapes (alleged of one hostel manager) arose out of these power imbalances. The hostels and espionage fed corruption. The Götzes apparently lived well, both from Götze's income from the French and from the funds for the hostels. 138 The hostel funds were apparently easy to augment by overreporting the number of residents (the Berlin Senate paid DM 2.50 per day for each) and inflating the number of employees maintaining them, while having the residents perform maintenance work for low or no wages. The Götzes' allies' loyalty could be secured by sharing the goods intended for hostel residents, and the Berlin official responsible for allocating residents was lavishly entertained to ensure that the League hostels continued to receive residents well after the 1953 uprising, when the overall number of refugees thinned. 139 How could the Götzes get away with it? According to an unofficial agent for the Stasi, "the League was financially supported in everything by the [West Berlin] Senate . . . but the Senate did not monitor where the money ended up"; the hostels were a "gold mine." 140 Götze's activities certainly did attract the attention of the Stasi. In December 1952, it caught six underground League members in the East German city of Chemnitz. The Stasi claimed that the League was developing a network inside the GDR for the distribution of anticommunist leaflets and for gathering information on the population's mood, on Red Army troops, and on industrial infrastructure. By early 1953, the League was, in the Stasi's eyes, a "neofascist" organization conspiring to overthrow the communist regime on "Day X" (Tag X ). 141 Then, in June 1953, an uprising really did take place in the GDR, surprising almost everyone in East and West. Now the Stasi, unable to accept that the uprising was spontaneous, wove the League and other militant anticommunist organizations into its own explanation of the uprising. It claimed that Western intelligence agents had been planted in various locations in the GDR to attempt a coup and that the whole uprising had thus been organized from afar. 142 In the months after the uprising, the East German state therefore targeted persons from the anticommunist organizations. One such person was Wolfgang Silgradt, who had come to West Berlin from East Germany in 1951 and was a caseworker in the League's department for East German refugees between August 1953 and February 1954, helping East Germans whose applications for asylum in West Germany had been rejected. In February 1954, he was kidnapped from West Berlin, taken to the GDR, and convicted as a provocateur of the uprising with three others who also worked in anticommunist organizations, in a show trial in June 1954. Silgradt served ten and a half years of a fifteen-year sentence before he was released to West Germany for payment. 143 The League had become caught in an awful symbiosis. From Götze's point of view, the League's cold war political work was probably attractive in the first place because it offered opportunities for personal enrichment and power over others. From the point of view of those League members who shared an ardent cold war orientation, the work of sifting through the refugees for information and maintaining a network in the GDR was important and Götze could do it effectively-so they were apparently willing to overlook or fail to investigate his troubling sidelines. Because documents are so few and scattered about the League in these years, it is not possible to reconstruct exactly what various League members knew about the Götzes and those who cooperated with them. . The Eastern Bureaus were agencies of West German political parties that sought to sustain independent party activity inside East Germany. 144 It is unclear whether Schaefer was intentionally cooperating with Götze or had been deceived by him. The report held in the Stasi archive mentions that Schaefer was a close friend of Götze but that he was very concerned with respectability and therefore unlikely to know of Götze's espionage and fraudulent activities. BStU MfS HA IX Nr. 3897, Bl. 144. It is also unclear why Götze's critics did not also take aim at Schaefer, his main protector. It is possible that Lehmann-Russbueldt felt dependent on Schaefer: he served as Lehmann-Russbueldt's lawyer and had secured a pension for the widow of Lehmann-Russbueldt's friend, the murdered pacifist Berthold Jacob. DEA NLR, Lehmann-Russbueldt to Retzlaw, November 24, 1952. as for the Social Democratic Party's Eastern Bureau and perhaps for France and the United States. He held the odd distinction of being convicted of espionage by both the Soviet Union and West Germany. 151 In 1956, von Hanstein left East Germany for West Berlin and gained official recognition as a political refugee. He joined the Berlin League and rose rapidly in it, holding Götze's old posts of vice president and general secretary. Using his position, he gathered information on League members, other anticommunist groups, and West German politicians. He enjoyed the trust of unsuspecting East Germans helped by the League. And he sent information on all these contacts to the Stasi, which used it to kidnap East Germans who had fled. 152 As one historian put it, the League was a useful "Trojan horse" for von Hanstein's espionage work in the Federal Republic. 153 Von Hanstein had been rumored to be a spy well before he was exposed. Yet Schaefer, still president, defended von Hanstein just as he had defended Götze. In December 1958, von Hanstein, with Schaefer's backing, carried out a coup. They held a meeting in Hamburg, which most Berlin members could not attend, elected a new board, and immediately recorded the result in the Hamburg court register for voluntary associations, making it legally binding. Von Hanstein then declared that all Berlin memberships were now invalid, and Schaefer put a new lock on the Berlin League's office so that no original board members could enter. Their plans behind these actions can no longer be reconstructed. At some point, von Hanstein stole the League's files from that office and delivered them to the Stasi. The League had lost all its records in 1933; now, it lost them again. Today, archivists of Stasi records believe that those files were destroyed in late 1989, when the Stasi rushed to prevent its information on West Germany from falling into Western hands.
Back in West Berlin, the old board members learned that the only way to undo von Hanstein's entry in the Hamburg register was a lawsuit. They decided not to waste money on a lawsuit, but rather to create a new organization-yet again. In January 1959 they founded the new International League for Human Rights (Internationale Liga für Menschenrechte), based in West Berlin, and affiliated it with the ILRM in New York. 154 157 The underlying problem that these and other writings of the early 1960s addressed was the extent to which West German society had truly absorbed democratic ideas. It was no coincidence that two new human rights organizations emerged at this time in West Germany, both founded in 1961: Amnesty International's West German section, and the Humanist Union (Humanistische Union), a civil liberties organization whose founding statement appeared in Walser's volume. 158 Through these three organizations, as well as others, discussions of politics and culture took hold that were not immediately identified with any political party, though their participants were often-not always-located on the Left.
The International League was carried into the center of these vibrant discussions by a number of public intellectuals who also became members and even leaders of the League. They comprised a who's who of 1960s West Germany. Two academics on the League's board were especially prominent: Ossip K. Flechtheim and Margherita von Brentano. Flechtheim, targeted both politically and as a Jew by the Nazis, had fled to the United States, where he taught political science. In 1952 he returned to Berlin to teach at the German Institute for Political Science (Deutsche Hochschule für Politik), which became part of the Free University of Berlin. A Social Democrat and then a founding member of the Green Party, he was a prolific scholar of Marxism, political parties, peace studies, and futurology (a field he helped create). 159 Von Brentano (1922-95) was a philosophy professor at the Free University. As a political activist, she promoted the study of antisemitism, the antinuclear movement, and women in higher education and was influential in the Berlin student movement. It was she who urged a young Wolfgang Fritz Haug to take over the League's newsletter, Argumente, which he and Frigga Haug developed into Das Argument, the leading Left journal in West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. 160 Several of the International League's most visible mem-bers were Jews and scholars of the Jewish experience of Nazism. The League helped sponsor some of the most important early exhibits and publications that offered factual knowledge about Nazi crimes. One League member was Joseph Wulf (1912-74), a survivor of Auschwitz, the author (with the French historian of antisemitism Léon Poliakov) of the earliest documentary histories of Nazism and the Holocaust, and the original advocate of creating a museum and study center at the villa where the Wannsee Conference was held. 161 Another was Gerhard Schoenberner, who has been a prolific writer on the Nazi past as well as the state of West German and unified German democracy (he contributed to both Skriver's and Walser's volumes). In 1960 he published The Yellow Star, a book of photographs and documents drawn from the League-sponsored exhibit The Past Admonishes Us (Die Vergangenheit mahnt). The exhibit aimed at educating a popular audience about Nazi crimes, and the League estimated that about 200,000 West Germans saw it. 162 Still other members were Manfred Rexin and Ansgar Skriver, who jointly published a book on the history of antisemitism in Germany in 1960 and became prolific authors. 163 Reinhard Strecker, another League member, publicized continuities in leadership personnel between Nazi Germany and the Federal Republic. Two of his best-known efforts were an exhibit he opened in 1959 entitled Nazi Justice Not Atoned For (Ungesühnte Nazijustiz), which exposed the cruel sentences imposed by Nazi-era judges who were still on the bench in the Federal Republic, and a 1961 book Dr. Hans Globke, documenting to similarly explosive effect the Nazi-era career of Adenauer's right-hand man, the State Secretary in the Chancellor's Office. 164 Of the events and campaigns that the League sponsored in its first few years, over half concerned Nazi crimes and their legacies; the remainder concerned issues related to decolonization and communism. 165 Clearly, anti-Nazi educational work provided the basis on which the League could engage controversy and absorb newcomers without facing co-optation and losing control of League ideals. Jews, the Holocaust, and anti-Nazi work were hardly popular causes in West Germany of the early 1960s. But the League no longer faced the problem of those who wanted to use its anti-Nazi reputation to hide or retouch their pasts, and it was now part of a wider indigenous (as opposed to Allied) confrontation with the Nazi past. For example, it could draw encouragement in its work of publicizing Nazi-era crimes from the Ulm Einsatzkommando trial (1958), the establishment of the Central Agency for the State Justice Administrations (Zentralstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen) to prosecute Nazi-era crimes (also 1958), and the Auschwitz trial (which began in 1963). Likewise, Israel's Eichmann trial (1961) riveted the West German public. The League was no longer a lonely voice. Of course the League had its enemies, especially due to the exposés it sponsored. But enemies and unpopular stances had never been a problem for the League-false friends were.
The years of crisis in the League, documented mostly in scraps of personal correspondence, offer a case study in some fundamental dilemmas of mobilizing a universalist language in the practical, and highly political, world. By adopting various versions of the universalist language of human rights in postwar West Germany, the League experienced the very dangerous grasp of the Stasi. It also felt the overwhelming pull of the expellee and German POW causes and of anticommunism-truly popular movements that almost engulfed it. The history of the League between 1945 and 1960 reveals the fault lines on which most human rights organizations are built. These organizations depend on information and money, but both can damage their reputation for independence, which is the sine qua non for the public's reception of their work. An organization survives on these fault lines by avoiding the dangers of co-optation on the one hand and irrelevance on the other. Investigating the history of such organizations is complicated, for the usual tactic of human rights organizations when facing difficult questions concerning their own work is a sophisticated silence.
The League also posed a question still discussed today: how to compare Germans with others as perpetrators of human rights violations, as victims, and as advocates of human rights. 166 By the 1960s, the expellee cause had developed its own major institutions, and the League, as well as West Germany's chapter of Amnesty International and the Humanist Union, continued to set the issue aside. The debate on its place in the West and in the unified German human rights movement has remained, however. The latest major instance of this debate concerns the planned Center against Expulsions (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen) in Berlin. Its anticipated centerpiece will be a museum presenting the experiences of ethnic German expellees alongside that of other twentieth-century European victims of deportation, forced transfer, or ethnic cleansing. 167 The controversy over this planned center has shown that no clear consensus regarding this question of situating Germans as victims of human rights violations has emerged. In fact, the very terms of the debate are reminiscent of the struggles in the League over "German human rights." The League's story reminds us that these conflicts regarding historical specificity and the universalist language of human rights had emerged already in the late 1940s and 1950s, as struggles over Germany's oldest human rights organization unfolded in occupied and early West Germany.
